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DECISIONAL MINIMALISM AND THE  
JUDICIAL EVALUATION OF GUN REGULATIONS 
RICHARD C. BOLDT∗
In District of Columbia v. Heller,
 
1 a sharply divided United States 
Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects “the right of law-abiding, responsible citi-
zens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”2  Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for the majority, made clear that the Court’s recognition of this 
right, which it found inconsistent with the District of Columbia’s re-
striction on the possession of handguns in the home, did not mean 
that persons have “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in 
any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”3  The Court chose 
not to delineate “the full scope of the Second Amendment,”4 and also 
“declin[ed] to establish a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second 
Amendment restrictions.”5  Instead, Justice Scalia carved out a “safe 
harbor”6 of gun regulations that are “presumptively lawful,”7 and ex-
plained that the District’s gun law would be unconstitutional under 
“any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights.”8
The majority opinion in Heller is significant both for the constitu-
tional right it established and for the questions of scope and opera-
tion associated with that right that it left unresolved.  Justice Scalia’s 
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 1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 635. 
 3. Id. at 626.   
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 634.   
 6. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)? Lower Courts 
and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1247–48 (2009). 
 7. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–29 (recognizing restrictions on “dangerous and unusual 
weapons,” on the possession of guns by felons and persons with histories of mental illness, 
and on the carrying of arms in sensitive places). 
 8. Id. at 628.  The right recognized in Heller applied only to federal laws.  Subsequent-
ly, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), the Supreme Court determined 
that the right, still significantly under-defined, applies through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the states as well. 
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choice to write this “narrow” opinion9 has “unleashed a flood of litiga-
tion” in the lower courts,10 as litigants and judges have confronted the 
uncertainty purposely left by the Supreme Court majority.  Woollard v. 
Sheridan, a test case brought in the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland by Raymond Woollard and the Second Amend-
ment Foundation, is one of many such cases to be presented in recent 
months.11  In his opinion concluding that Maryland’s handgun per-
mitting statute is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, 
Judge Benson Everett Legg addressed in an expansive fashion one of 
the questions of operation left open by Justice Scalia’s narrow Heller 
opinion—the degree of fit constitutionally required between a gun 
permitting regulation and the State’s interest in public safety.12
Justice Scalia’s choices, both with respect to the interpretive tools 
that he employed in Heller and the underlying interpretive perspective 
that animated his analysis in that case, suggest that Judge Legg’s ag-
gressive application of intermediate scrutiny in Woollard may have 
been misplaced.
   
13  While Justice Scalia’s Heller decision relies on famil-
iar “conservative” interpretive methods, including a hard-edged tex-
tual analysis and a heavy dose of originalism,14 in order to find a 
“core” right of individual citizens to possess guns in their homes for 
self defense, his further choice to avoid resolving significant questions 
of scope and operation reflects a different form of conservative consti-
tutional jurisprudence, which Professor Cass Sunstein has termed 
“Burkean minimalism.”15  In recent years, Supreme Court Justices as-
sociated with conservative originalism have been in some tension with 
others operating within the Burkean minimalist tradition.16
 
 9. Piszczatoski v. Filko, Civ. No. 10-16110 (WHW), 2012 WL 104917, at *6–7 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 12, 2012); Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235, 259–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  See also 
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1674 (2011) (Judge Easterbrook urging that Heller not be over-read). 
  Justice 
 10. Stephen Kiehl, Comment, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations after Heller and 
McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1132 (2011). 
 11. Woollard v. Sheridan, Civil No. L-10-2068, 2012 WL 695674 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2012). 
 12. Id. at *10–12. 
 13. I regard Judge Legg’s intermediate scrutiny analysis as aggressive because of the 
relative lack of deference it accords to the policy decisions reached by Maryland officials.  
For a discussion of this form of intermediate scrutiny, see infra text accompanying notes 
45–50. 
 14. See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006) (describing 
three jurisprudential schools within conservative constitutional thought: originalism, con-
servative perfectionism, and Burkean minimalism). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Sunstein identifies “massive disagreements” between Burkean minimalists and con-
servative originalists.  In part, he describes the difference as follows: “Originalists are in the 
grip of a priori reasoning.  Burkean minimalists prize stability, and they are entirely willing 
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Scalia’s decision to deploy original meaning analysis (and his version 
of textualism) to ground the core right, but to shift to Burkean prin-
ciples of judicial restraint when it came to addressing the scope and 
operation of that right, is therefore significant and also instructive for 
lower courts seeking guidance on the meaning of the Second 
Amendment.  Judge Legg’s analysis, I believe, misses that instruction 
and is thus at odds with the implied message of Heller. 
Professor Sunstein’s notion of “decisional minimalism” first 
emerged in his 1996 Foreword to the Harvard Law Review, where he 
urged a form of decision making in which judges say “no more than 
necessary to justify an outcome” and leave “as much as possible unde-
cided.”17  Sunstein further elaborated this theory in subsequent pub-
lished work, including a 2006 article in the Michigan Law Review en-
titled Burkean Minimalism.18  Although he identifies commonalities 
between conservative originalism, conservative perfectionism, and 
Burkean minimalism—the three types of conservative constitutional 
thought that he catalogues—Sunstein explains that Burkean conserv-
atives are unsettled by originalists because of the latter’s relative indif-
ference to the acts and judgments of actors within the constitutional 
order in the many years since the Founding, and by conservative per-
fectionists because of their extreme “rationalistic” reliance on theory 
building instead of settled practice and tradition.19
Sunstein describes the essential features of the Burkean perspec-
tive in the following terms:  
 
Burkean minimalists believe that constitutional principles 
must be built incrementally and by analogy, with close refer-
ence to long-standing practices.  Like all minimalists, Bur-
keans insist on incrementalism; but they also emphasize the 
need for judges to pay careful heed to established traditions 
and to avoid independent moral and political arguments of 
any kind.20
Importantly, in Sunstein’s version of Burkean minimalism, judi-
cial practitioners should hew closely to established traditions and seek 
gradual incremental solutions, because of a pragmatic rule-
consequentialist commitment to the idea that such an approach is 
  
 
to accept rulings that do not comport with the original understanding when a decision to 
overrule them would disrupt established practices.”  Id. at 358–59. 
 17. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–8 (1996).   
 18. Sunstein, supra note 14. 
 19. Id. at 358–59. 
 20. Id. at 356. 
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“likely to produce better results, all things considered, than reliance 
on theories of one or another kind, especially when those theories are 
deployed by such fallible human beings as judges.”21  An important 
dimension of this form of judicial minimalism is its strong preference 
for narrow decisions.  Narrow rulings, he explains, “focus on the par-
ticulars of the dispute before the Court.”22  By so limiting the law mak-
ing associated with the judge’s dispute-resolution function, Sunstein 
suggests that a minimalist approach is likely to produce fewer errors 
than other approaches that rely on broad rulings (or, at the least, is 
likely to produce errors that are not as “serious and difficult to re-
verse”).23  In part, this is because judges necessarily lack sufficient in-
formation to predict how a broad ruling might apply to the many, dif-
ficult to anticipate, future situations that could arise over time.  In 
addition, the “small steps” inherent in narrow rulings “preserve” the 
Court’s future “options,” and reduce the costs of implementation and 
the transaction costs brought about by wide judicial decisions that of-
ten unsettle long-established traditional practices.24
Professor Sunstein acknowledges that Burkean minimalism, and 
its preference for narrow rulings, carries certain costs.  First, he points 
out that narrow decisions may “breed unpredictability and perhaps 
unequal treatment,”
 
25 and, in fact, the uncertainty costs of decisional 
minimalism can be significant.  A quick survey of the many state and 
lower federal court cases in the Second Amendment context post-
Heller and post-McDonald would seem to bear out that observation.26  
In addition, because this approach “‘export[s]’ decision-making du-
ties to others in a way that can increase those burdens in the aggre-
gate,”27
 
 21. Id. at 359. 
 it is likely that the system-wide costs of decision making will be 
increased as a consequence of judicial reliance on incremental rul-
ings.  Not only are questions of scope and operation left unresolved 
 22. Id. at 362. 
 23. Id. at 363.  It is fair to ask at this point what the responsibility of a lower court 
should be in response to a narrow Burkean minimalist opinion of the Supreme Court.  As 
I explain below, Burkean minimalism couples narrow decision making with a strong pre-
sumption in favor of established practices and traditions.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 31–33.  That second feature of decisional minimalism provides significant guidance 
to lower courts in this respect. 
 24. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 363. 
 25. Id. at 365.   
 26. In his concurring opinion in United States v. Chester, Judge Davis observed that “Hel-
ler has left in its wake a morass of conflicting lower court opinions regarding the proper 
analysis to apply to challenged firearms regulations.”  628 F.3d 673, 688–89 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(Davis, J., concurring). 
 27. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 366. 
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by the Supreme Court likely to arise in lower federal courts and state 
courts, they also are likely to occupy more of the time and attention of 
those legal advisers to state legislatures and executive branch officials 
who must make reasonable predictions about whether various regula-
tory options are likely to pass constitutional muster going forward. 
Both the potential advantages and costs of the Burkean approach 
to constitutional adjudication then are on display in the Second 
Amendment context.  Justice Scalia was clear in Heller that, because 
this was the Court’s “first in-depth examination of the Second 
Amendment,” the Justices were not attempting to “clarify the entire 
field.”28  Describing both the scope and operation of Second 
Amendment rights after Heller as “a vast terra incognita” the Fourth 
Circuit in United States v. Masciandaro observed that it is “not far-
fetched to think” that Heller intentionally left open the application of 
the Second Amendment outside the home because the dangers of ac-
cidentally formulating the right to bear arms too broadly “would rise 
exponentially as one moved the right from the home to the public 
square.”29  Picking up on this Burkean preoccupation with risk avoid-
ance, the Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Dawson explained that 
the United States Supreme Court has “deliberately and expressly 
maintained a controlled pace” in unfolding its Second Amendment 
jurisprudence precisely to avoid errors.30
The majority opinion in Heller reflects the Burkean minimalist 
preference for narrow decisions designed to minimize risk, but its 
adoption of a second key element of Burkean minimalism also sug-
gests the way forward.  Because of the inherent uncertainty that nar-
row decision making produces, this second injunction of Sunstein’s 
minimalist theory, which requires judges to be mindful of and defe-
rential to longstanding settled practices and traditions, becomes espe-
  
 
 28. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).   
 29. 638 F.3d 458, 475–76 (4th Cir. 2011).    
 30. 934 N.E.2d 598, 605 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2880 (2011), abroga-
tion recognized by People v. Williams, 2011 Ill. App. 093,350 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).  Professor 
Sunstein suggests that the goals of Burkean minimalism are served both by narrow deci-
sions and by “shallow” ones.  He defines a shallow decision as one that attempts “to pro-
duce rationales and outcomes on which diverse people can agree, notwithstanding their 
disagreement on or uncertainty about the most fundamental issues.”  Sunstein, supra note 
14, at 364.  On these terms, one could characterize the Supreme Court’s decision in 
McDonald as a shallow decision, given that the five Justices who agreed that the Heller right 
applies against the states relied upon two different legal theories to derive that result.  Pro-
fessor David Cohen has characterized this as an example of a voting paradox, noting that 
there was no majority on the Court for any one legal theory supporting the outcome in the 
case.  See David S. Cohen, The Paradox of McDonald v. City of Chicago, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 823 (2011); David S. Cohen, McDonald’s Paradoxical Legacy: State Restrictions of Non-
Citizens’ Gun Rights, 71 MD. L. REV. 1213 (2012). 
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cially important.31  One can observe this second feature of Burkean 
minimalism in the Court’s identification of “safe harbors” for long-
established gun regulations, but also in its indication that the exam-
ples of constitutionally permissible regulation provided by the Court 
are not meant to be an exhaustive list.32  Thus, while the Court’s rec-
ognition of a core right in Heller clearly is meant to take certain regu-
latory options “off the table,”33
The Woollard case presents questions both as to the scope of the 
right recognized in Heller and the operation of that right.  That is, the 
case provided Judge Legg with an opportunity to address whether the 
Second Amendment right extends beyond the home, a question of 
scope that the Fourth Circuit previously had left unresolved,
 the majority also instructs lower courts 
to address with caution those statutes and regulations that have a set-
tled and well-established place outside of the core.  In Burkean terms, 
this use of tradition is essential to mitigate the very uncertainty 
created by the Court’s narrow ruling in the first instance.  
34 and 
whether the Maryland gun regulation at issue in the case meets the 
constitutional standard of intermediate scrutiny, assuming the right 
does extend to the possession and carrying of guns outside the 
home.35
The relevant portions of the Maryland statute that Mr. Woollard 
and the Second Amendment Foundation challenged prohibit the 
open or concealed carrying of a handgun outside the home without a 
permit.
 
36  The State officials charged with responsibility for determin-
ing whether to issue such a permit are directed by the law to insure 
that an applicant meets certain enumerated conditions, particularly 
relating to a past criminal record, a history of substance misuse, or a 
“propensity for violence or instability.”37
 
 31. See Sunstein, supra note 
  In addition, an applicant 
must establish that he or she “has good and substantial reason to 
wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that the permit 
is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended dan-
14, at 359. 
 32. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26. 
 33. Id. at 636. 
 34. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 474. 
 35. Woollard v. Sheridan, Civil No. L-10-2068, 2012 WL 695674, at *10–12 (D. Md. 
Mar. 2, 2012). 
 36. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4–203 (West 2010), declared unconstitutional by 
Woollard v. Sheridan, Civil No. L-10-2068, 2012 WL 695674 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2012); Md. 
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5–303 (West 2010).   
 37. Woollard, 2012 WL 695674, at *1.  These aspects of the Maryland permit statute 
were not challenged in Woollard. 
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ger.”38  In making a determination whether an applicant has a “good 
and substantial reason,” State officials must consider “whether the ap-
plicant has any alternative available to him for protection other than a 
handgun permit,” and “whether the permit is necessary as a reasona-
ble precaution for the applicant against apprehended danger.”39  
There is a substantial body of law instructing State officials in the ap-
plication of this standard.40
In his opinion granting summary judgment to Woollard and the 
Second Amendment Foundation, Judge Legg determined that the 
right recognized in Heller does extend beyond the home and thus is 
implicated by Maryland’s handgun permitting scheme.
 
41  He further 
determined that portions of that law fail intermediate scrutiny and are 
therefore unconstitutional.42
Under Judge Legg’s version of intermediate scrutiny, the ques-
tion is whether Maryland’s permitting scheme is “reasonably adapted 
to a substantial government interest.”
  Although the decision to reach and de-
cide the scope question—the question whether the right extends 
beyond the home—may itself have been in tension with the decisional 
minimalism that characterizes Heller, it is possible to concede that 
point and still conclude that the form of intermediate scrutiny em-
ployed by the District Court was inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s approach to developing Second Amendment jurisprudence. 
43  Judge Legg acknowledges 
that the “degree of fit” between the gun regulation and the conceded-
ly legitimate police power goal of “promoting public safety need not 
be perfect; it must only be substantial.”44  But he then determines that 
the Maryland statute fails the fit portion of this test, because of “the 
overly broad means by which it seeks to advance this undoubtedly le-
gitimate end.”45
 
 38. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5–306(a)(5)(ii). 
  Judge Legg asserts that the regulation is, in effect, a 
“rationing system” designed “simply to reduce the total number of 
firearms carried outside of the home by limiting the privilege to those 
 39. MD. CODE REGS. 29.03.02.04 (2012).  An individual whose permit application has 
been denied may appeal the decision to the Handgun Permit Review Board, which may 
sustain, reverse, or modify the decision. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5–312 (West 2010). 
 40. The leading case is Snowden v. Handgun Permit Review Bd. of the Md. Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety & Corr. Servs., 45 Md. App. 464, 413 A.2d. 295 (1980). 
 41. Woollard, 2012 WL 695674, at *5–7. 
 42. Id. at *10–12. 
 43. Id. at *10.  
 44. Id. (quoting Heller v. District of Columbia, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 191 (D.D.C. 2010), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).  Interestingly, if read together 
these two statements suggest that both the ends and the fit must be “substantial.”  
 45.  Id.  
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who can demonstrate ‘good reason’ beyond a general desire for self-
defense.”46  In response to the State’s arguments that limiting the to-
tal number of handguns carried in public is a good thing because the 
general presence of handguns presents a danger to the public and the 
police, the court concludes that “[t]hese arguments prove too much,” 
because “the challenged regulation does no more to combat [the 
public safety dangers posed by handguns] than would a law indiscri-
minately limiting the issuance of a permit to every tenth applicant.”47  
The statutory limitation, on this logic, “is not tailored to the problem 
it is intended to solve.”48
While Judge Legg’s exacting examination of the degree of tailor-
ing in this case might be sustainable under strict scrutiny, it is a cu-
rious form of intermediate analysis, particularly given that the court 
considers only the State’s interest in reducing the costs associated 
with handgun carry but not its interest in simultaneously maximizing 
the potential benefits of permitting a relatively small subset of indi-
viduals with particularly compelling needs to carry weapons notwith-
standing the possibility that their gun may be wrested away during an 
assault or misused in an unforeseen way.  That the State had identi-
fied a reduction in the overall number of handguns present in public 
as one of its goals does not necessarily mean that the statutory scheme 
was “simply”
  
49
 
 46. Id. at *11. 
 designed to accomplish that one objective.  Policy mak-
ers could plausibly have sought a balance of outcomes, including the 
overall reduction of handguns coupled with efforts to insure that 
those guns remaining in use would be in the hands of those who 
would most benefit from having them.  That choice, to weigh the rela-
tive risks and benefits of a regulated practice and to shape statutes 
and regulations to maximize the multiple public policy objectives in 
tension, is, after all, the sort of discretionary judgment that officials in 
the political branches of state government regularly make, and that a 
more deferential form of scrutiny should seek to accommodate.  In-
deed, such an accommodation is especially appropriate in this field, 
given that the Supreme Court, adopting a Burkean minimalist stance, 
has signaled an intention to go slowly and to build up the law with 
considerable regard for well-established policies and practices, plausi-
bly including regulations governing the issuance of handgun carry 
permits. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. 
 49. By which I understand Judge Legg to have meant “exclusively.” 
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As a contrast to Judge Legg’s analysis in Woollard, it is useful to 
consider the approach to intermediate scrutiny adopted by Judge Wil-
liam H. Walls in Piszczatoski v. Filko, a case decided by the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey just two months ear-
lier.50  Piszczatoski also involved a Second Amendment challenge to a 
state handgun permitting law, in this instance a New Jersey provision 
limiting handgun permits to applicants able to demonstrate a “justifi-
able need.”51  After a lengthy and far more conservative analysis of the 
scope issue,52 Judge Walls turned to the question whether the New 
Jersey requirement survives intermediate scrutiny.  Framing the analy-
sis according to a standard derived from the Third Circuit’s First 
Amendment speech cases, Judge Walls found first that the govern-
ment’s interest in public safety was “important or even compelling.”53  
With respect to the fit component of the test, Judge Walls, guided by a 
principle of “substantial deference to the [legislature’s] predictive 
judgments,”54 concluded that New Jersey policy makers had not acted 
on “political whim” but had instead made “reasonable inferences 
based on substantial evidence.”55  Judge Walls noted the State’s ex-
press policy “to limit the use of guns as much as possible,”56 and in-
voked the reasoning of the District Court in Peruta v. County of San Di-
ego, that a statute requiring a particularized showing of need was a 
constitutionally permissible means of accomplishing an important go-
vernmental interest in “reducing the number of concealed weapons 
in public in order to reduce the risks to other members of the pub-
lic.”57
Perhaps most relevant to the Burkean norms established in the 
Heller decision, Judge Walls’s intermediate scrutiny analysis in Piszcza-
toski accorded substantial significance to the longevity of the State’s 
policy.  His opinion pointed out that the New Jersey legislature had 
decided as early as 1924 to adopt a permitting scheme in which indi-
   
 
 50. Piszczatoski v. Filko, Civ. No. 10-16110 (WHW), 2012 WL 104917 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 
2012). 
 51. Id. at *1. 
 52. Id. at *4–16 (concluding that New Jersey’s handgun permit law does not burden 
conduct protected by the Second Amendment). 
 53. Id. at *21 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); Schall v. Mar-
tin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984)). 
 54. Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at *22 (quoting State v. Valentine, 307 A.2d 617, 619 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1973)). 
 57. Id. at *21 (quoting Peruta v. County of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1110, 
1117 (S.D. Cal. 2010)). 
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viduals would be required to make a “showing of ‘need’,”58 and 
stressed that the “need” requirement had been retained in all of the 
subsequent iterations of the statute.59  Similar evidence of the 
longstanding nature of handgun regulation in Maryland was available 
to Judge Legg in the Woollard case as well.  Although the tenure of the 
provision scrutinized in Woollard is not as lengthy as that of the New 
Jersey statute, a prior version of the current permitting law in Mary-
land was enacted roughly four decades ago.60  In addition, a statutory 
prohibition against the concealed carry of handguns was adopted in 
Maryland as early as 1886,61 which suggests that significant limitations 
on a citizen’s ability to possess and carry handguns in public have 
been part of the State’s legislative tradition for well over a century.62
Notwithstanding the variations in statutory approach to handgun 
regulation from Maryland to New Jersey to California and elsewhere 
in the United States, the broader context here is that handgun regu-
lation has a long and well-established pedigree in state laws going 
back to the nineteenth century.  A 1915 article in the Harvard Law Re-
view reasoned: 
   
The guaranty is to insure the safety of the people, their “laws 
and liberties,” against assaults from any source or quarter, 
but not to give individuals singly or in groups uncontrollable 
means of aggression upon the rights of others.  Granting 
that the individual may carry weapons when necessary for his 
personal defense or that of his family or property, it is sub-
mitted that he may be forbidden to carry dangerous wea-
pons except in cases where he has reason to believe and 
does believe that it is necessary for such defense.  In fine, I 
venture the opinion that, without violence to the constitu-
tional guaranty of the right of the people to bear arms, the 
carrying of weapons by individuals may be regulated, re-
stricted, and even prohibited according as conditions and 
 
 58. Id. at *21. 
 59. Id.. 
 60. S.B. 205 (1972). 
 61. 1866 Md. Laws, ch. 375, § 1. 
 62. Perhaps in recognition of the State’s early regulation of concealed handguns, 
Judge Legg noted at the end of his intermediate scrutiny analysis that he would not “spe-
culate as to whether a law that required a ‘good and substantial reason’ only of law-abiding 
citizens who wish to carry a concealed handgun would be constitutional.”  Woollard v. She-
ridan, Civil No. L-10-2068, 2012 WL 695674, at *12 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2012).  The 1886 sta-
tute severely restricting concealed carry is relevant more broadly, however, to show the 
State’s longstanding tradition of handgun regulation outside of the home. 
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circumstances may make it necessary for the protection of 
the people.63
To the extent that the Supreme Court embraced Burkean mini-
malism in Heller, the tradition of balanced handgun regulation in the 
states generally, and the more particular regulatory practice in Mary-
land, ought to count significantly in both the determination of the 
scope of the right and in its operation.  The judicial exercise of in-
termediate scrutiny under these circumstances, while not toothless ra-
tional basis review, should be characterized by a deferential stance to-
ward the sensitive public policy judgments reached decades ago and 
maintained over the years by officials in the legislative and executive 
branches of state government.  Many lower courts confronting these 
issues have explicitly or implicitly recognized the essentially conserva-
tive nature of this developing jurisprudence, its Burkean incremental-
ism.  The District Court in Woollard chose a more aggressive path, and 
in that respect misread the important cautionary signals that the Su-
preme Court majority has provided.   
 
 
 63. Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 
473, 477 (1915). 
